There Will Be War Volume X Read online

  We now live in an era of irregulars and special forces, and technological weapons of previously unimagined power.

  But the following statement by a contributor to the second volume of There Will Be War remains true all the same:

  You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did—by putting your soldiers in the mud.

  –T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War

  THE 4GW COUNTERFORCE

  by William S. Lind and LtCol Gregory A. Thiele, USMC

  The History of Light Infantry

  Due to different meanings of the word “light,” light infantry has been understood in diverse ways around the world. These interpretations can be grouped into two different points of view. The present American concept of light infantry is related to weight, specifically weight of equipment, while Europeans understand “light” as relating to agility or operational versatility. They see light infantry as a flexible force capable of operating in austere conditions with few logistical requirements and employing tactics unlike those of line or mechanized infantry.

  The distinction between regular or line infantry and light infantry goes back to ancient Greece. At that time, the regular infantry was the phalanx, a linear formation that based its power on mass and shock. Their tactics consisted of evolutions performed by the phalanx as a whole, in which each warrior adhered to carefully executed drills.

  In contrast, classic light infantry did not fight in fixed formations, nor did it adhere to any type of prescribed methods. Its primary mission was to provide flank protection to the phalanx. Widely dispersed throughout a large area, its soldiers lacked the heavy bronze armor worn by hoplites. The survivability of the light infantry depended on speed and the use of bows, slings, and hand-thrown weapons. Light infantry tactics consisted mainly of individual actions or simple, loosely coordinated group maneuvers that were generally limited to advancing or withdrawing. The Romans applied the Greek concept to their legions, using light auxiliary infantry to support the heavily armored cohorts of their regular infantry.

  After the medieval era, when cavalry ruled the battlefield, the Spanish tercios of the 16th and 17th centuries signaled the return of the infantry’s dominance. The development of light infantry in Europe followed in the 18th century. The French chasseurs, the Prussian Jaegers, and the Austrian Grenzer regiments followed the ancient Greek concept; in contrast to the rigid maneuvers of their line infantries, the light units were fast, agile, and expected to adapt their tactics to the terrain and the situation.

  Much as their predecessors had been in the past, the Napoleonic light infantry was employed in a decentralized manner to protect the flanks of larger forces, and to execute raids and ambushes in restricted terrain. As before, the light infantry was always careful to avoid frontal engagements with the enemy. When it was wisely employed, light infantry could sometimes prevail over the enemy’s regular infantry thanks to its adaptability and reliance on creative tactics rather than drilled battlefield order. These capabilities were achieved by selecting high-quality troops to serve in the light infantry, often professional hunters or foresters.

  In spite of the proven utility of light infantry units, they were not established as permanent formations in European militaries. Light infantry units only prospered during wartime, and they were usually dissolved when the conflict ended. The catastrophic defeat in 1755 in Pennsylvania of the British forces under General Edward Braddock by a small force of Indians and French light infantry that employed ambush tactics and took advantage of terrain, agility, and loose formations convinced the British to create Roger’s Rangers and the Royal American Regiment, both of which eventually became famous light infantry units during the French and Indian War. Typically, both were dissolved when the war ended.

  Light infantry reappeared in Europe during the wars surrounding the French Revolution. The light infantry ceased to be regarded as an “undisciplined group of irregulars” and were transformed into trained professional units, able to maneuver in a decentralized, but fast and organized manner. Between 1790 and 1815, light forces proliferated, even evolving into light artillery and light cavalry units. They also assumed a more significant role on the battlefield. Yet their basic role remained no different than that of their ancient Greek predecessors, as the European light infantrymen covered the regular infantry’s advances and withdrawals, and harassed the enemy by executing ambushes deep in its rear.

  The appearance of the breech-loading rifle and the machine gun gradually reshaped regular infantry tactics, which began to resemble more closely those of light infantry. However, true light infantry retained advantages in agility, operational versatility, capability for living off the land, and decentralized command and control. The Boers of the Transvaal Republic; the Jaeger battalions, mountain units and Sturmtruppen of the German army of World War I; General Wingate’s Chindits; and the paratroop units of the Israeli Defense Forces and the British army are examples of true modern light infantry.

  The Light Infantry Mentality

  The appearance of semi-automatic and automatic weapons narrowed the tactical distance between light infantry and regular infantry. However, the essential difference between them remains. It is not easily observed because it is an intangible factor: the mentality of the light infantryman.

  The light infantryman is characterized by his mental resourcefulness and physical toughness. Light infantry’s inborn self-reliance, reinforced by hard training, convinces the light infantryman that he is capable of overcoming the most difficult situations that combat presents. Light infantrymen do not feel defeated when surrounded, isolated or confronted by superior forces. They are able to continue performing their duties and pursue their objectives for long periods of time without any type of comfort or logistical support, usually obtaining what they require from the land or the enemy. They are neither physically nor psychologically tied to the rear by a need to maintain open lines of communication. Their tactics do not depend on supporting arms. This attitude of self-confidence and self-reliance provides light infantry with a psychological advantage over its opponents.

  Thanks to its decentralized command philosophy, light infantry operates at a high tempo. An ambush mentality, a preference for unpredictability, and a reluctance to follow rigidly specified methods are the essence of light infantry tactics. The ambush mentality generates other secondary light infantry characteristics. One is the speed with which light infantry adapts to the terrain. Far from resisting adverse environmental conditions, light infantry exploits them by turning rough terrain to its advantage, using the terrain as a shield, a weapon, and a source of supplies.

  As a result, light infantry has an incomparable superiority in those terrains that restrict most regular infantry operations (especially mechanized forces), usually allowing the light infantry to face and defeat larger and better-equipped enemy forces whenever it encounters them. This advantage gives the light infantry its distinctive operational versatility, as it is able to operate alone in restricted terrain or in a symbiotic relationship with friendly units.

  Light infantry is readily adaptable to a broad range of missions, and it faces the natural evolution of technology and tactics that always takes place in wartime with no need to substantially modify the way it operates. It should now be easy to see that the correct meaning for the term “light” is not the American notion of weight, but the European concept of agility and operational versatility.

  Light Infantry Tactics

  Light infantry tactics are offensive in character, even during defensive operations. Light infantrymen do not hold a line. Light infantry tactics follow the principles of maneuver warfare, attacking by infiltration and defending by ambush. It uses ambushes on the offensive as well, by ambushing withdrawing or reinforcing enemy units, sometimes deep in the enemy’s rear. Light infantry applies an ambush mentali
ty to both planning and execution.

  A good way to understand light infantry tactics is to think of them as similar to those often used by “aggressors” or the “red team” during training exercises. Lacking the means to execute their missions in textbook fashion, they fight by deceiving, stalking, infiltrating, dispersing, looking for vulnerabilities, ambushing and raiding. They often prove highly effective against larger “blue” forces.

  Light infantry operations often follow a cycle that can be divided into four steps: Dispersion, Orientation, Concentration, and Action (DOCA). Dispersion provides light infantry with its main tool for survivability. Units remain hidden, taking advantage of the terrain, using camouflage and fieldcraft to evade detection. Orientation includes shaping actions that “set up” the enemy and permit rapid concentration. This step requires an aggressive use of reconnaissance to identify enemy vulnerabilities the light infantry can exploit.

  Concentration allows light infantry to transform the small combat power of many dispersed elements into one or more powerful thrusts. Action is led by reconnaissance elements, which focus available forces and target a specified enemy weakness. Finally, a new and rapid dispersion ends the cycle, protecting the light infantry from enemy counteraction.

  Light infantry offensive tactics usually use infiltration to avoid casualties. Infiltration allows light forces to surprise the enemy and engage him at short distances. In close, light infantry can exploit its small arms skills while denying the enemy effective employment of his superior firepower. Light infantry hugs the enemy and forces him to fight at short ranges on its terms.

  Defensive Tactics and “Force Protection”

  Light infantry defenses are dispersed and granular, which prevents the enemy from determining the exact location of the defense’s front, flank, or rear areas. This protects light infantry from concentrated firepower. The light infantry commander assigns sectors to each of his subordinates, areas where they plan and execute successive, independent ambushes on advancing enemy formations. The “baited ambush” is a common technique, where a unit will feign retreat or even rout to draw enemy units into a new ambush. Defenses run parallel to, not across, enemy thrust lines. Light infantry often focuses its efforts against follow-on enemy units rather than spearheads.

  When threatened, light infantry units break contact and move to alternate positions, setting up a new array of interconnected ambushes. Light infantry never fights a defensive battle from fixed positions or strong points. From the light infantry perspective, a good defensive position is one that surprises the enemy from a short distance, but at the same time enables the defender to move fast and under cover to a new position unknown to the enemy.

  Since light infantry lives mostly off the land, its success depends heavily on the support of the local population. This dependence on local support means light infantry operations always need to avoid a negative impact on the inhabitants and the local economy, as well as rigorously observe local customs and culture. This ties in directly with requirements for success in Fourth Generation wars.

  Light Infantry vs. Fourth Generation Opponents

  Most Fourth Generation forces are light infantry, some quite good, for example, Hezbollah and the Pashtuns. How does state light infantry defeat them? By being better light infantry than they are.

  Fourth Generation war light infantry is likely to have some advantages over state light infantry. It will usually know the terrain better. It is likely to start out with stronger support among the local population, especially if the state forces on the other side are foreign. That support will mean a superior information network, among other benefits.

  But at the tactical level, a state light infantry should usually be the more skillful force. State light infantrymen are full-time soldiers, while most Fourth Generation fighters will be part-time militiamen. State forces have more resources for training, better equipment, better logistics, and they can employ supporting arms when the opportunity arises, although they do not depend on them. State light infantry should be more skilled at techniques, including marksmanship and tactical employment of machine guns and mortars. Assuming they can at least match their Fourth Generation enemies in tactical creativity, the state light infantry’s superiority in techniques should usually be decisive.

  The superiority of state light infantry does depend on their being employed correctly. If they are compelled to defend static positions, given detailed, controlling orders, overburdened with weight (they should seldom if ever wear body armor or helmets; the soldier’s load should not exceed 45 pounds), or tied to supporting arms or to communications “networks” that require constant input, they will lose the advantage they should have over non-state light infantry. Requiring cats to hunt like dogs will benefit only the mice.

  For those interested in further reading on the subject of the use of light infantry in 4th Generation War, “The 4GW Counterforce” is a selection from The 4th Generation War Handbook, Castalia House, 2015.

  Editor’s Introduction to:

  BATTLE STATION

  by Ben Bova

  Establishment of world government is an old theme in science fiction, and of course the first question is always the age-old question asked by Juvenal in the First Century AD: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” Who will watch the watchers? And if no one does, what then?

  In December 1980 I chaired a committee tasked with writing space policy for the transition team coming to Washington with Ronald Reagan. Part of that paper discussed missile defense. We advocated Strategic Defense and a policy of Assured Survival as opposed to the then-prevalent policy of Mutual Assured Destruction as the primary means for deterring a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. At that time the Soviet Union had some 20,000 nuclear weapons aimed at the United States. Mutual Assured Destruction—MAD—basically said, if you kill us, we will kill you back. To that end we hardened the ICBM force to assure the survival of missiles; “boomer” nuclear submarines were always on patrol; and manned bombers and their required tankers were on ready alert at Air Force bases in the U.S. and abroad. Looking Glass, a KC-135 with a general officer and staff aboard, was in the air 24 hours a day to provide command and control. Looking Glass didn’t approach its landing field until another aircraft with a general officer was in the air and gone far enough that it would survive a nuclear attack on its base. We took MAD seriously.

  The policy advocated to the Reagan Team was to add Strategic Defense to this mix; that the Constitution had as its purpose “to provide for the common defense”, not for the common destruction. The policy was adopted by the Reagan administration. Senator Ted Kennedy called it “Star Wars” and the appellation stuck; but it became the Strategic Defense Initiative, and even if the Soviet missile force could have been revised to defeat some of the SDI proposals, the economic costs were prohibitive. The Cold War effectively ended in 1990, and the Soviet Union ceased to be shortly after.

  After World War II there were numerous world government proposals. Herman Kahn thought that something of the sort would be inevitable after any nuclear exchange. The alternative was Cold War and MAD. A number of science fiction stories explored the concept. The problem was simple: to keep the world safe from nuclear weapons required someone to enforce that ban. Custodians.

  But quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

  BATTLE STATION

  by Ben Bova

  Author’s Introduction to “Battle Station”

  “Where do you get your crazy ideas?”

  Every science fiction writer has heard that question, over and over again. Sometimes the questioner is kind enough to leave out the word “crazy.” But the question still is asked whenever I give a lecture to any audience that includes people who do not regularly read science fiction.

  Some science fiction writers, bored by that same old question (and sometimes miffed at the implications behind that word “crazy”), have taken to answering: “Schenectady!” There’s even a mythology about it that claims members of the Science Fic
tion Writers of America subscribe to the Crazy Idea Service of Schenectady, New York, and receive in the mail one crazy idea each month—wrapped in plain brown paper, of course.

  Yet the question deserves an answer. People are obviously fascinated with the process of creativity. Nearly everyone has a deep curiosity about how a writer comes up with the ideas that generate fresh stories.

  For most of the stories and novels I have written over the years, the ideation period is so long and complex that I could not begin to explain—even to myself—where the ideas originally came from.

  With “Battle Station,” happily, I can trace the evolution of the story from original idea to final draft.

  “Battle Station” has its roots in actual scientific research and technological development. In the mid-1960s I was employed at the research laboratory where the first high-power laser was invented. I helped to arrange the first briefing in the Pentagon to inform the Department of Defense that lasers of virtually any power desired could now be developed.

  That was the first step on the road to what came to be called the Strategic Defense Initiative.

  My 1976 novel Millennium examined, as only science fiction can, the human and social consequences of using lasers in satellites to defend against nuclear missiles. By 1983 the real world had caught up to the idea and President Reagan initiated the “Star Wars” program. In 1984 I published a nonfiction book on the subject, Assured Survival. In 1986 a second edition of that book, retitled Star Peace, brought the swiftly-developing story up to date.